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Abstract. Mammals, and humans in particular, are endowed with an
exceptional capacity for cumulative learning. This capacity crucially de-
pends on the presence of intrinsic motivations, i.e. motivations that are
not directly related to an organism’s survival and reproduction but rather
to its ability to learn. Recently, there have been a number of attempts to
model and reproduce intrinsic motivations in artificial systems. Different
kinds of intrinsic motivations have been proposed both in psychology
and in machine learning and robotics: some are based on the knowl-
edge of the learning system, while others are based on its competence.
In this contribution we discuss the distinction between knowledge-based
and competence-based intrinsic motivations with respect to both the
functional roles that motivations play in learning and the mechanisms
by which those functions are implemented. In particular, after arguing
that the principal function of intrinsic motivations consists in allowing
the development of a repertoire of skills (rather than of knowledge), we
suggest that at least two different sub-functions can be identified: (a)
discovering which skills might be acquired and (b) deciding which skill
to train when. We propose that in biological organisms knowledge-based
intrinsic motivation mechanisms might implement the former function,
whereas competence-based mechanisms might underly the latter one.
1 Introduction
The capacity of autonomous cumulative learning demonstrated by complex or-
ganisms like mammals, and humans in particular, is astonishing. This capacity
is likely to have its roots in intrinsic motivations, i.e. motivations not directly
related to extrinsic rewards such as food or sex, but rather to what the animal
knows (curiosity, novelty, surprise) or can do (competence). Both animal and
human psychologists have found evidence indicating that intrinsic motivations
play an important role in animals’ behavior and learning (Berlyne, 1960; Deci,
1975; Deci and Ryan, 1985; White, 1959).
Recently, the study of intrinsic motivations has been gaining increasing at-
tention also in machine learning and robotics, as researchers in these fields have
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recognized that truly intelligent artificial systems need to develop their own abil-
ities while autonomously interacting with their environment (Weng et al., 2001).
The potentially open-ended complexification of a system’s skills might require
the use of learning signals that are non-task-specific, and hence intrinsic. As a re-
sult, several computational models of intrinsically motivated learning have been
proposed so far, but the study of artificial intrinsically motivated cumulative
learning systems is still in its infancy.
The aim of the present chapter is to aid the development of this field by
clarifying issues related to different kinds of intrinsic motivations, both with re-
spect to the possible mechanisms that might implement intrinsic motivations
and to the possible functions that they might play in cumulative learning. In
particular, the paper focuses on the distinction between knowledge-based and
competence-based intrinsic motivations, that is intrinsic motivations that are
based on what the system knows vs. on what the system can do. Note that what
the system knows can include also knowledge (e.g. predictions) about the results
of the systems actions. And, viceversa, competence-based intrinsic motivations
might involve the use of predictions for obtaining measures related to compe-
tence. What really distinguish knowledge-based by competence-based system is
that the former use measures that are related to the capacity of the system to
model its environment (including the system’s body and the interactions be-
tween the system and the environment), whereas the latter use measure that are
related to the system’s ability to have specific effects on the environment.
We start (section 2) by reviewing the psychological literature on intrinsic
motivations, highlighting an important distinction that can be made between
intrinsic motivations driven by what a system knows (knowledge-based) and
those driven by what it can do (competence-based). Then we review the com-
putational modeling literature from the perspective of an analogous distinction
between knowledge-based and competence-based intrinsic motivation systems
(section 3). In section 4 we suggest that the distinction between knowledge-based
and competence-based systems can and should be made not only with respect to
the mechanisms of intrinsic motivations, but also with respect to their functions,
that is with respect to what kind of learning they support; and we argue that the
ultimate function of intrinsic motivation is to support the cumulative learning
of skills, rather than knowledge. Unfortunately, this is not the case for many of
the computational models proposed in the literature so far (section 5), in partic-
ular for those employing knowledge-based mechanisms. Indeed, we suggest that
purely knowledge-based systems might not be particularly well suited for driving
the cumulative acquisition of skills (section 6). Finally, we consider the problem
of intrinsic motivations from the point of view of a hierarchical learning system
(section 7): here we argue that different kinds of intrinsic motivations might play
different functional roles at different levels of the hierarchy, and we refer to the
possible neural bases of both knowledge-based and competence-based intrinsic
motivations in real brains. Section 8 concludes the paper by summarizing our
contributions and discussing promising directions for future research.
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2 Intrinsic motivations in Psychology
Interest in intrinsic motivations first arose in the 1950s in the field of animal
psychology, as several researchers discovered a number of phenomena that were
in apparent contrast to the extremely influential theory of motivation proposed
by Hull (1943). According to Hull’s theory, animal behavior was motivated by
drives, conceived as temporal physiological deficits that the organism is led to
reduce in order to achieve homeostatic equilibrium. Typical examples of drives
are hunger and thirst, which make the animal work for achieving respectively
food and water so as to satisfy its needs for energy and liquid. According to Hull,
all motivations are either physiological primary drives or secondary drives de-
rived from primary ones through learning (as it happens in classical conditioning
experiments).
Notwithstanding the popularity of Hull’s theory, soon animal psychologists
reported phenomena that were difficult to reconcile with the drive concept. For
example, Harlow and co-workers (Harlow, 1950; Harlow et al., 1950) reported
that rhesus monkeys might spend long periods of time in trying to solve me-
chanical puzzles without any reward. Kish and colleagues reported that operant
conditioning phenomena (i.e., phenomena related to the fact that the rate of
responding to a manipulandum can be influenced by the consequences of these
responses) could be elicited in mice not only by primary rewards but also by
apparently neutral stimuli that had never been associated with rewards, such as
“microswitch clicks, relay noises, and stimuli produced by a moving platform”
(Kish, 1955; Kish and Antonitis, 1956). Similarly, Butler showed that rhesus
monkeys could learn a discrimination task by using as a reinforcement just the
possibility to look at other conspecifics from a window (Butler, 1953).
Some authors, such as Montgomery (1954), tried to reconcile these findings
with Hull’s theory by postulating the existence of other drives, like drives to
manipulate, to play, or to explore. But this move was hard to accept because
exploratory drives do not seem to possess any of the two fundamental charac-
teristics of primary drives: they are not related to any internal deficit and they
do not seem to have any homeostatic function.
2.1 Knowledge-based views
The considerations reported above led several psychologists to develop explana-
tions of intrinsic motivations that were not based on the drive concept. Among
them, probably the most influential proposal was the one of Berlyne (1960). Ac-
cording to him animal exploration and intrinsically motivated activities in gen-
eral depend on the fact that animals are attracted by optimal levels of novelty
of stimuli, of their complexity, and of surprise, conceived as a falsification of the
animal’s expectations. As it can be noted, all the intrinsic motivations proposed
by Berlyne are knowledge-based, in that they are related to the properties of the
stimuli that the animal perceives and on their relation to the animal’s knowl-
edge. (Note that Berlyne never made the distinction between knowledge and
competence we are discussing here: this is just our interpretation of his work.)
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Several similar knowledge-based proposals have been made in the psychological
literature. These postulated either that animals are motivated to receive an op-
timal level of stimulation (or of novelty of stimuli) (e.g. Hebb, 1955; Hunt, 1965)
or that they are motivated to reduce the discrepancy (or incongruity, or disso-
nance) between their knowledge and their current perception of the environment
(e.g. Dember and Earl, 1957; Festinger, 1957; Kagan, 1972).
2.2 Competence-based views
On the other hand, in his seminal review on motivations, White (1959) strongly
advocated a competence-based view of intrinsic motivations, proposing that an-
imals have a fundamental motivation for effectance, i.e. for the capacity to have
effective interactions with their environment. White’s paper had a great influence
on subsequent research on motivation. In particular, in the fields of educational
and human psychology the link between intrinsic motivations and the concept of
competence has remained quite strong since then (Deci, 1975). For example, ac-
cording to self-determination theory (Deci and Ryan, 1985) there is a continuum
between extrinsically and intrinsically motivated activities. Among the most im-
portant factors that make an activity intrinsically motivated are the sense of
autonomy, that is the perception that the activity is self-determined, and the
sense of competence, that is the perception that we have (or are getting) mastery
of the activity (Ryan and Deci, 2000). Similarly, De Charms proposed that per-
sonal causation, that is the sense of having control over one’s environment, was
a fundamental driving force of human behavior (De Charms, 1968). Likewise,
the theory of flow of Csikszentmihalyi postulates that humans are motivated
to engage in activities that represent an appropriate level of learning challenge,
i.e. that are neither too easy nor too difficult to master given the individual’s
current level of competence (Csikszentmihalyi, 1991).
3 Computational models of intrinsic motivations
The distinction between knowledge-based and competence-based intrinsic mo-
tivations can also be appropriately applied within the context of the computa-
tional literature on intrinsic motivations. In this field, a useful and typical way
of framing the problem of intrinsic motivations consists in considering it within
the computational framework of reinforcement learning (e.g Barto et al., 2004;
Oudeyer and Kaplan, 2007; Schembri et al., 2007c; Schmidhuber, 1991b, see also
Barto, 2012). Reinforcement learning algorithms are developed so as to maximize
the sum of future rewards, where a reward is defined as a numerical value that
is continuously received by the learning agent (Sutton and Barto, 1998). In this
context, intrinsic motivations can be conceived as components of the rewards
that are not directly related to the task that the agent must solve but are rather
task-independent.
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3.1 Knowledge-based models
Most of the proposed models of intrinsic motivations are knowledge-based as
they depend on the stimuli perceived by the learning system (and on their re-
lations with the system’s expectations, including those related to the results of
the system’s actions) rather than on the system’s skills. For example, the first
model of intrinsic motivations for an artificial reinforcement learning agent was
proposed by Schmidhuber (1991b). It consisted in adding to a reinforcement
learning agent an adaptive world model that learned to predict the next percep-
tion given the current perception and the planned action, and in using the errors
in these predictions as an intrinsic reward for the system. The intrinsic reward
complemented the extrinsic reward related to the task at hand. The rationale
of this proposal was that in this way the “curious” reinforcement learning agent
would be pushed not only to maximize external rewards but also to improve its
own world model, thus exploring poorly-known parts of the environment.
The recognition that this kind of system would get stuck in parts of the envi-
ronment that are unpredictable (where the prediction error can never decrease)
led Schmidhuber to propose to use as an intrinsic reward signal a measure of the
learning progress (namely, the decrease in prediction error) of the world model
(Schmidhuber, 1991a). An analogous idea has been recently explored in the con-
text of developmental robotics by Oudeyer and colleagues under the name of
Intelligent Adaptive Curiosity, together with a mechanism for automatically di-
viding the whole sensorimotor space into subregions within which to compute the
learning progress and on which to focus learning (Oudeyer et al., 2007). Several
other models have been presented in which the intrinsic motivation consists of
some form of perceived novelty, prediction error, or learning progress of a world
model (Huang and Weng, 2002; Lee et al., 2009; Marshall et al., 2004; Merrick
and Maher, 2009; Saunders and Gero, 2002; Storck et al., 1995).
3.2 Competence-based models
Contrary to what has been stated by Oudeyer and Kaplan in their useful re-
view (Oudeyer and Kaplan, 2007), there are also a few computational models
of artificial systems whose learning is driven by some form of competence-based
intrinsic motivations. The first of such systems is the Intrinsically Motivated Re-
inforcement Learning (IMRL) agent proposed by Barto and colleagues (Barto
et al., 2004; Stout et al., 2005), which is based on the reinforcement learning
framework of options (Sutton et al., 1999). In short, an option is a temporally
extended action defined by an initiation set (the set of states in which the option
can be initiated), a policy (the states-actions mapping followed during the exe-
cution of the option), and a termination set (the set of states in which the option
terminates). In practice, an option defines a skill that can be recalled each time
the agent needs to achieve one of the option termination states. These states
can be considered as the option goals. In IMRL options are created for reaching
different salient events, where salient events are specified by the experimenter as
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the opening of a door, the ringing of a bell, or the switching on of a light. Intrin-
sic rewards, perceived when the salient events are reached, are defined as 1− the
(estimated) probability of reaching the salient event with the executed option. In
other words, the intrinsic reinforcement is given on the basis of the unpredicted
occurrence of salient events. As the authors themselves explicitly state, this is a
form of prediction error and so, in this respect, it is analogous to the knowledge-
based intrinsic motivations discussed above. However, the prediction error in this
case is not calculated at every state, but only on the goal states of the options
(whenever these are reached). Hence, the intrinsic reward is given on the basis
of the (lack of) ability of the system to reach one of its goal-states. Hence, in
this case the intrinsic reward should be considered as competence-based, rather
than knowledge-based.
The use of competence-based intrinsic rewards is more explicit in a model
we have proposed (Schembri et al., 2007a,b,c). This was directly inspired by
the IMRL framework, but instead of using options it implements skills on the
basis of experts, each of which is an instance of the actor-critic reinforcement
learning architecture (Barto et al., 1983) trained with the temporal differences
(TD) learning algorithm (Sutton, 1988). The model is hierarchical and so it is
also formed by a selector which assigns the control of action (and the possibility
of learning) to experts. Each expert is assigned a reward function and when
given the control it improves the policy of its actor (states-actions mapping) on
the basis of the TD error, that is the error of its critic related to the prediction
of future discounted rewards. The selector learns to assign the control to experts
on the basis of an intrinsic reward signal represented by the TD error of the
expert selected at each step. The rationale of this is that the TD error of an
expert can be considered as a good estimate of the improvement of its policy.
Indeed, a positive average TD error of an expert means that it is behaving
better than expected by its own critic, which means that it is improving its
ability to maximize rewards. Viceversa, a zero average TD error indicates that
it is behaving as expected, meaning that it is not improving. By receiving the
TD error of the selected expert as its reward, the selector will learn to give the
control to the expert that, in a given context, is expected to improve its skill the
most.
Here it is clear, even more than in Barto’s IMRL, that even though the in-
trinsic motivation signal for the selector (the TD error of the selected expert)
is a form of prediction error, it is a competence-based signal, since the predic-
tion error is relative to the obtained rewards, and hence it is a measure of skill
improvement rather than of the agent’s ability (or inability) in modeling its en-
vironment. The fact that the TD error is a signal that is related to performance
has important consequences for the possible problem of unlearnability. As dis-
cussed above, an intrinsically motivated knowledge-based system that uses the
prediction error as a reward will get stuck in parts of the environment that are
not predictable. In contrast, a system that uses the TD error as its intrinsic
reward will not get stuck in parts of the environment where the reward is unpre-
dictable because in that case the evaluations (predictions of future discounted
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rewards) will become equal to the average received reward and the TD error will
be sometimes positive (when the reward is received) and sometimes negative
(when the reward is not received). Hence, the reinforcement learning system will
learn to predict that the average reward is zero and will pass to explore other
parts of the environment where some skill learning progress can be made. In
fact, in contrast to the method proposed by Barto and colleagues, this kind of
competence-based intrinsic motivation is able to solve not only the problem of
unpredictability of rewards, but also the problem of unlearnability of a skill,
and for the same reason. If, for whatever reason, a skill cannot be learned, the
evaluations of the expert will equal the average received reward, the TD error
signal will average to zero, and the selector will learn that the skill cannot be
trained and will prefer experts that can improve their performance.
Two more recent models of competence based intrinsic motivations are Stout
and Barto (2010), which is quite similar to our own, and Baranes and Oudeyer
(2010), which is not based on reinforcement learning but on control theory.
4 Functions vs. mechanisms and the primacy of
competence over knowledge
Up to now we have reviewed the psychological and computational modeling lit-
erature on intrinsic motivations from the point of view of the distinction between
knowledge-based and competence-based hypotheses. Following Oudeyer and Ka-
plan (2007) we have so far related this distinction to the mechanisms that drive
intrinsically motivated behavior and/or learning processes. An analogous but
even more important distinction can be done with respect to the function that
intrinsic motivations are considered to play within the overall system. Whereas
there is a general agreement on the fact that intrinsic motivations serve the role
of driving the learning of a system, it is much less clear (but it is important to
clarify) which kind of learning intrinsic motivations are supposed to support: is
it learning of knowledge or learning of competence? In other words: do intrin-
sic motivations help the system in building increasingly accurate models or do
they allow to discover more effective ways of acting on (interacting with) the
environment?
The answer will probably reflect a more general and fundamental (we might
call it philosophical) attitude that one takes in considering human beings and
other animals as well as in building artificial intelligent systems. What is more
important: knowledge or action? No doubt, the western culture has been giving
prominence to knowledge over action: from Plato’s World of Ideas, to Descartes’
cogito ergo sum, to Kant’s primacy of the Critics of Pure Reason over the Crit-
ics of Practical Reason, and so on. This strong cultural legacy is evident also in
modern Cognitive Science, which poses at the very center of the study of psy-
chology the study of how human beings process information inside their heads
rather than of how they behave and interact with their environment. Since their
birth in the 1950s, the same general attitude has also informed the sciences of
the artificial (Simon, 1996), that is disciplines such as artificial intelligence and
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machine learning. For decades the focus of research of these disciplines has been
on reasoning, problem solving, knowledge representation on one hand (Russell
and Norvig, 2003), and perception and categorization on the other (Mitchell,
1997), whereas the study of behavior has been almost neglected. This state of
affairs has started to change, at least from the point of view of artificial systems,
in the 1990s, when classical artificial intelligence was criticized and “invaded”
by new robotics (Brooks, 1991), artificial life (Langton, 1989), adaptive behav-
ior research (Meyer and Wilson, 1990), and reinforcement learning (Sutton and
Barto, 1998), which started to gain increasing attention within machine learning.
Indeed, what is common to all these new approaches and clearly distinguishes
them from the old ones is their attitude with respect to the knowledge versus
competence issue: all of them emphasize the primacy of behavior over represen-
tation, of action over cognition, and of competence over knowledge (Clark, 1997;
Pfeifer and Scheier, 1999).
The rationale behind this fundamental shift lies in evolutionary considera-
tions: animals evolved on the basis of their capacity to survive and reproduce,
and survival and reproduction depend primarily on what organisms do, not on
what they know. What is selected for is the capacity to adaptively interact with
one’s own environment in ever increasingly complex and efficient ways, not the
capacity to accurately represent the environment in one’s head (on this point, see
also Barto, 2010). This does not mean that the capacity to represent the world
is useless and should not be investigated. Rather, it means that knowledge is
ancillary to behavior, rather than the other way round. Hence, in general, the
capacity to model the environment should be considered as one possible (but not
necessary) tool for improving an agent’s capacity of interacting with the envi-
ronment, and not as the ultimate goal of an organism or of an artificial system.
In other words, some form of knowledge might be useful in some circumstances
for some purposes. But it should be kept in mind that perfect knowledge is not
the ultimate goal of any living organism, and it should not be the goal of any
useful artificial system. Indeed, understanding which kind and level of knowl-
edge can be useful for which kind of behaving system in which circumstances is
a fundamental challenge for both the empirical and the synthetic behavioral and
brain sciences.
5 Functional roles of intrinsic motivations in
computational models
Coming back to the question about the ultimate function of intrinsic motiva-
tion which we introduced in the previous section, it should now be clear what
our stance is, and why: whatever the mechanisms which implement intrinsic
motivations, their primary and fundamental function is to allow a system to
develop a cumulative repertoire of useful skills (rather than an increasingly ac-
curate knowledge of the environment). We think not only that this is true for
real organisms, but that this should be the standpoint from which to consider
the endeavor of building intrinsically motivated artificial systems. We feel the
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need to underscore this point because it is not clear to what extent this position
is shared among computational modelers.
Surprisingly as it might seem, the majority of computational models of intrin-
sic motivations not only use knowledge-based mechanisms, but have the acqui-
sition of knowledge as their only function. For example, Schmidhuber’s (1991a)
curious agent is a “model builder”, whose goal is the improvement of its pre-
dictions. The same is true for the robots used to test the Intelligent Adaptive
Curiosity algorithm of Oudeyer and collegues (Oudeyer et al., 2007), and for al-
most all other systems whose intrinsic motivations are based on knowledge (e.g.
Huang and Weng, 2002; Lee et al., 2009; Marshall et al., 2004; Merrick and Ma-
her, 2009). On the contrary, competence-based intrinsic motivation mechanisms
have been always used for improving skills (Baranes and Oudeyer, 2010; Barto
et al., 2004; Schembri et al., 2007c; Stout and Barto, 2010).
It is important to note that this need not necessarily be the case. Indeed, the
distinction between the functions of knowledge-based and competence-based in-
trinsic motivations is different from the one related to the mechanisms underlying
them. It is possible for knowledge-based intrinsic motivation mechanisms to help
improve the learning agent’s skills (as it happens, for example, in Schmidhuber,
2002), as it is possible for competence-based mechanisms to serve the acquisition
of knowledge. But these possibilities in principle must be demonstrated in prac-
tice, and in doing so there might be some difficulties. As the focus here is in the
use of intrinsic motivations for the acquisition of skills, the next section discusses
only the possible problems related to the use of knowledge-based mechanisms for
accumulating competence, while it does not consider the less relevant possibility
of using competence-based intrinsic motivations for acquiring knowledge.
6 Knowledge-based mechanisms and competence
As a representative example of a purely knowledge-based system (i.e. a sys-
tem which uses only knowledge-based mechanisms) let us consider the work of
Oudeyer et al. (2007). In the presented experiments, the authors show how the
proposed system demonstrates an interesting developmental trajectory: it starts
by focusing its learning on those parts of the sensorimotor space where predic-
tions are easier, and when knowledge in those parts has been acquired the system
shifts its attention to the parts where predictions are more difficult. But while
it is clear that through this developmental history the system accumulates in-
creasingly complex knowledge about the sensorimotor contingencies of its world
(and of the robot’s body - world interactions), the authors never show that any
competence (i.e. ability to do something) has been acquired. All you can observe
is that the actions that are chosen at the beginning of learning are different from
those that are chosen at the end, but no accumulation of skills is demonstrated.
The same happens in most other works on knowledge-based intrinsic motivation
systems (e.g. Huang and Weng, 2002; Lee et al., 2009; Marshall et al., 2004;
Schmidhuber, 1991b; Storck et al., 1995, but see Baranes and Oudeyer, 2009 for
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a case in which the use of the knowledge acquired through intrinsic motivations
for control, i.e. competence, is demonstrated).
What are then the relationships between such knowledge-based systems and
the acquisition of competence? There might be different answers to this question,
the first of which simply stating that the ultimate goal of learning is not to
acquire skills, but rather knowledge. For the reasons discussed above, however,
we are not satisfied by this position. Indeed, if one is interested in understanding
the mechanisms underlying the intelligent behavior of organisms, or in building
robots which can act intelligently, one has to solve the problem of how knowledge
can support the acquisition of skills.
One possibility is that once an accurate model of the sensory consequences of
actions have been acquired, this model can directly guide behavior through its
inversion, as it is done in some forms of model-based control (Hof et al., 2009):
given the current goal of the system and the current context, the agent might
internally simulate the consequences of all its actions and choose to perform
the one whose predicted consequence are more similar to the goal (this is the
approach taken, for example, by Baranes and Oudeyer, 2009). This approach has
the problem that it may be computationally very expensive, and it might become
just unfeasible in realistic conditions, where the spaces of states and actions are
high-dimensional or continuous. In these conditions, as primitive actions cannot
usually directly lead to desired states, sequences of actions must be used and so
the complexity of the search grows exponentially.
Another possibility might be to suggest that the acquired model can be used
for training the behavioral controller, as it happens, for example, in the distal
teacher framework (Jordan and Rumelhart, 1992). Notwithstanding the attrac-
tiveness of this idea, this seems to represent a very indirect route to skill learning.
Indeed, consider that this solution would involve (a) training of a behavioral sys-
tem (on the basis of knowledge-based intrinsic motivations) so that (b) it favors
the training of a predictor (c) which then is used for training a second behavioral
system (or for retraining the first one) to pursue its goals. Why not following
a more straightforward route and directly train the skills? We do not want to
deny that building models of the effects of the agent’s own actions is useful for
learning kills. In fact, we do think that prediction plays fundamental roles for
action execution and learning. What we are questioning here is the idea that
models are learnt before and independently from the skills that they are sup-
posed to support. Hence, in our view, modeling abilities should complement and
aid acquisition of skills, not replace them.
Yet another possibility is to claim that using knowledge-based intrinsic re-
wards can directly help the system not only in improving its knowledge, but also
in improving its skills (this is the position taken by Schmidhuber, 2012). The
idea is that by being rewarded by some form of prediction error (or improvement
in prediction) a behaving system will tend to reproduce the actions that lead to
unexpected consequences. Once the capacity to systematically reproduce those
consequences has been acquired, a good model can be developed, prediction er-
ror (improvements) will decrease together with the intrinsic rewards, and the
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system will move on and try to learn something else. Though we think that this
idea is on the right track, it might still suffer of some important limitations.
The fundamental problem is that in order for a purely knowledge-based mech-
anism to optimally support the acquisition of a cumulative collection of skills,
one should assume a very strict and direct link between knowledge and com-
petence that seems difficult to justify. For example, what can assure that the
predictions related to the system’s own actions are in general more interesting
than those that depends only on the environment? If this cannot be guaranteed,
what would prevent a purely knowledge-based intrinsic-motivation system to
stop moving and spend its time in passively observing and modeling interesting
parts of the environment instead of focusing on learning useful skills?
Furthermore, there are certainly a lot of situations that are challenging to
predict but for which the actions are relatively trivial or even irrelevant. For
example, imagine a humanoid robot that has the goal of clearing a table full
of different objects by pushing them on the floor. Predicting the effects of own
actions is surely possible but very complex. Instead, the action of pushing all
objects on the floor is rather easy to be learned and accomplished. If the system
is intrinsically motivatedy only to increase its knowledge what would prevent
the system in spending its time moving all the objects in all possible positions
instead of focusing on the simple actions that would satisfy the goal? Of course,
here the level of detail of the predicion is of the most importance, as for example
predictions regarding the presence or absence of objects on the table (rather tha
their exact location) would be easier to learn and suitable to drive the acquisition
of the skill of clearing the table. But the problem is that which is the right level
of detail for the prediction depends on the competence you want to acquire; how
can a purely knowledge-based system decide which is the level of abstraction
that is appropriate for improving competence?
And for many difficult skills there might even be no level of detail in predic-
tions that would be appropriate for the the system to learn. If the problem is
too difficult, the desired consequences might be just too unlikely to manifest for
the skill to be learned through knowledge based intrinsic motivations alone. For
example, think about the ability to juggle three balls: how could one acquire this
ability through purely knowledge-based intrinsic motivations? If predictions are
done at the level of the positions of the balls in space the system would go on for-
ever in learning the irrelevant predictions about all possible results of its actions
of throwing the balls in all directions. But even if the predictions regard a more
appropriate representation of the state space, for example reagrding whether or
not a ball has been caught, the task is so difficult that after some unsuccessfull
attempts, the predictor will learn that the behaving system is not able to catch
the ball on the fly, the prediction error (and prediction improvements) will go
to zero, and the system will loose interest in the activity and pass to something
else. The general point is that when I want to learn juggling my behavior seems
to be driven by a motivation that is directly related to the acquisition of that
particular skill, and not just to the general predictions of the consequences of
my movements.
12 Marco Mirolli and Gianluca Baldassarre
Finally, another key problem of the models of knowledge-based intrinsic mo-
tivations proposed so far is related to the cumulativity of learning. When the
behaving system has learnt to systematically reproduce a certain consequence
and the rewarding prediction improvements decrease to zero, the reinforcement
learning system will begin to receive less rewards than expected and start to un-
learn the just acquired behavior. This is exactly what happens, for example, in
the system of Schmidhuber (1991b): once predictions within a given part of the
sensory-motor space are learnt, the system gets bored and learns to avoid the
actions just acquired. Hence, after training the system has cumulated knowledge
but no competence. For an intrinsically motivated system to be cumulative in
the acquisition of skills, it is necessary not only to temporarily focus its training
on different sensorimotor activities, but also to have a means for storing skills
after they have been successfully discovered so that the system’s repertoire can
increase and old skills can be reused and combined to learn new ones. Hence, it
seems impossible to study intrinsic motivations for cumulative learning without
considering the architectural issue of how skills can be cumulated.
7 Intrinsic motivations and skills accumulation
7.1 Hierarchy and modularity of skill organization
A multi-task learning system seems to need two key ingredients: (a) some form
of structural modularity, where different skills are at least partially stored in
different parts of the system, and (b) some form of hierarchical organization,
where a higher-level system is responsible for selecting which low-level module
(expert) to use and train in each context. The need for a structurally modular and
hierarchical organization of action has sometimes been questioned, most notably
by the work of Botvinick and Plaut (2004) and of Tani and colleagues (e.g. Tani
et al., 2008; Yamashita and Tani, 2008). But the two basic features of structural
modularity and hierarchy are common to the vast majority of computational
models that deal with the acquisition of several skills, even though they are
instantiated in different ways within different systems (Baldassarre, 2002; Barto
et al., 2004; Barto and Mahadevan, 2003; Caligiore et al., 2010; Dayan and
Hinton, 1993; Dietterich, 2000; Doya et al., 2002; Haruno et al., 2001; Parr and
Russell, 1997; Schembri et al., 2007c; Singh, 1992; Tani and Nolfi, 1999; Wiering
and Schmidhuber, 1997).
Furthermore, action selection and learning in real brains seem in fact to
display a considerable level of modular and hierarchical organization (Fuster,
2001; Grafton and Hamilton, 2007; Miller and Cohen, 2001; Redgrave et al.,
1999). Action selection is supposed to be implemented in the basal ganglia (Mink,
1996; Redgrave, 2007), a group of subcortical structures that is also thought to
be responsible for the processes underlying reinforcement learning phenomena
(Barto, 1995; Doya, 2000; Houk et al., 1995; Joel et al., 2002). Interestingly,
the basal ganglia form a number of parallel loops with most of the cortex, and
in particular with those parts that are most directly related to action, i.e. the
whole frontal cortex and associative parietal and temporal areas (Alexander
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et al., 1986; Joel and Weiner, 1994). These parallel loops can be observed at
different levels of abstractions. First, loops are present at the level of macro-areas,
thus forming different networks supposed to implement different functions: e.g. a
limbic network (with orbitofrontal cortex), an associative network (with dorsal
prefrontal cortex, parietal cortex, and temporal cortex), and a sensory-motor
network (with motor and premotor cortex) (Yin and Knowlton, 2006). Second,
parallel loops are present within each macro-area, for example distinguishing
parts of the motor cortex related to the control of different actuators, e.g. an
arm (Romanelli et al., 2005). Finally, within each sub-area dedicated to a specific
actuator, different loops might be responsible for implementing different actions
(Gurney et al., 2001).
If one assumes that the accumulation of skills requires a learning architecture
that is at least partially modular and hierarchical, the problem of identifying
good intrinsic learning signals splits in two sub-problems, as different levels of the
hierarchy are likely to require different signals. In a system composed of several
experts implementing different skills and a selector that arbitrates between them,
the problem for each expert consists in identifying which skill to acquire and
how, whereas the problem for the selector consists in deciding what to learn
and when, i.e. which skill to train in each context (Baldassarre and Mirolli,
2012). What kind of learning signals can help to solve these problems? We argue
that knowledge-based rewards might be used for training the experts, while
competence-based learning signals might be used for training the selector.
7.2 Knowledge-based signals for skill acquisition
In line with most machine learning research, here we consider a skill as the ability
to reach a certain final state (goal) in some conditions. This is also in line with
how behavior seems to be organized in real brains, where actions are defined, at
least at the cortical level, by their end-states, i.e. their outcomes, rather than
by the specific movements that are performed by the subject (Graziano, 2006;
Rizzolatti and Luppino, 2001). In this respect, probably the most important
problem that an autonomous learning system should solve is the identification
of the skills that it is worth acquiring. In other words, an autonomous cumulative
learning agent must not only learn how to reach certain states, but also which
states of the world can be achieved in certain contexts given the appropriate
behavior. We think that knowledge-based intrinsic motivation mechanisms might
represent appropriate solutions to both these problems. In particular, both the
discovery of which are the possible skills to be acquired and the training of
these skills might be driven by the same reinforcement signals provided by the
detection of unpredicted events.
A possible way in which this might happen has been recently proposed by
Redgrave and Gurney (2006, see also Gurney et al., 2012; Redgrave et al., 2012)
as the repetition bias hypothesis. If the detection of an unpredicted change in the
environment is immediately followed by a learning signal that biases the agent to
reproduce the actions performed before the change, this might lead the system to
focus learning on the change and to identify which are the specific aspects of the
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behavior that caused the event. This result will be achieved on the basis of the
statistics of the agent-environment interactions: those aspects of the behavior
that cause the environmental change will be reinforced more than those that do
not, thus further increasing the probability of being deployed. As the behavior
of the system is sculpted and starts to reliably produce the same environmental
change, the change becomes predictable on the basis of the performed actions,
and so stops producing intrinsic rewards (Mirolli et al., tted; Santucci et al.,
2010).
This hypothesis can explain otherwise puzzling findings related to the neural
basis of reinforcement learning, in particular, regarding the phasic activation of
the neuromodulator dopamine. Phasic dopamine is released in the basal ganglia
when rewards like food are received, and this enhances the plasticity of striatal
synapses (Reynolds and Wickens, 2002). Furthermore, after learning has taken
place, phasic dopamine is no more released in conjunction with reward deliv-
ery, but is rather anticipated at the time of the presentation of the stimulus that
allowed predicting the reward (conditioning). If after learning the reward is omit-
ted, a dip in baseline dopamine release is observed at the time of the predicted
reward. All these data have led to propose that phasic dopamine constitutes
the biological analog of the TD error signal of reinforcement learning models,
and represents the reward prediction error that drives biological reinforcement
learning (Houk et al., 1995; Schultz et al., 1997; Schultz and Dickinson, 2000).
But there are several known phenomena that do not fit the reward predic-
tion error hypothesis of phasic dopamine, which are not discussed here as they
are reviewed at length in Redgrave et al. (2012). The most important point for
the present discussion is the fact that phasic dopamine is triggered not only in
the presence of rewards (or reward predicting stimuli, see above), but also in
response to all kinds of unpredicted salient events, including sudden luminance
changes and sounds (Dommett et al., 2005; Horvitz, 2000), likely based on the
processes taking place in a subcortical brain structure named superior colliculus.
This supports the hypothesis discussed above that unpredicted events can gener-
ate intrinsic reinforcement signals that support the acquisition of novel actions.
Interestingly, dopamine release is triggered not only by the superior colliculus in
response to unexpected simple environmental changes, but also by the hippocam-
pus in response to the detection of novel situations (Lisman and Grace, 2005,
see also Otmakova et al., 2012). Indeed, the novelty signals of the hippocampus
seem to depend on the detection of associative novelty, that is novelty in the con-
textual, spatial, and temporal association between perceived stimuli. For these
reasons we speculate that the release of dopamine in the presence of novel situ-
ations might underlie the intrinsically motivated learning of skills of increasing
complexity, where the outcomes of the actions to be acquired are not only defined
by simple instantaneous events but also by spatial and temporal relationships
between objects in the environment.
It is important to note that these dopamine signals that are supposed to drive
the intrinsically motivated acquisition of skills are simple signals related to un-
predicted (or novel) events and states, not to prediction learning progress, as pre-
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dicted by sophisticated knowledge-based intrinsic motivation models (Oudeyer
et al., 2007; Schmidhuber, 1991a, see also (Schmidhuber, 2012)). How then can
biological intrinsic motivation systems avoid getting stuck in trying to learn and
reproduce events that are not predictable? The solution can be in the presence
of competence-based intrinsic motivation mechanisms at the higher level of the
hierarchy.
7.3 Competence-based signals for deciding which skill to train
If, as discussed above, cumulative learning depends on a hierarchical system
where different modules learn different skills and a higher-level system selects
which module must control behavior in each moment, then the unpredictability
problem need not be addressed at the level of the single skills, but can be solved
at the level of the selector. Indeed, as the selector is in charge of making strategic
decisions about the system activities, it is the selector that has to avoid wasting
time in situations where there is nothing to be learned. And this can be done in
case the selector is trained with some form of competence-based intrinsic reward
signal.
A working example is the use of the TD error of the experts as the selector
reward in the modular hierarchical reinforcement learning system presented in
section 3 (Schembri et al., 2007a,b,c). As mentioned there, such an intrinsically
motivated system does not risk getting stuck in unlearnable situations as the TD
learning of experts used to train the selector is a measure of the learning progress
of the experts themselves, so the selector will learn to use, in each context, the
expert that is learning the most. This works equally well whatever the reason
why an expert cannot learn: an ability too difficult to be acquired or intrinsic
stochasticity of action effects and rewards. In any case, the selector will use an
expert only as long as it can learn something; when no competence learning
progress is made, the TD error will average to zero and the selector will prefer
to move to something else.
Importantly, in order for such a solution to work, the competence-based in-
trinsic reward to the selector must measure learning progress of a skill (as it
is the case for Schembri et al., 2007a,c and for the more recent model of Stout
and Barto, 2010). If the reward reflects the inability of an expert to reach its
goal state, as in the original proposal of intrinsically motivated reinforcement
learning of Barto et al. (2004), the overall system is subject to the problem of
unlearnability just as a purely knowledge-based system trained by prediction
errors. In this case, the system could easily get stuck trying to pursue states
(or changes of states) that do not depend on its own actions, or that are just
completely random.
While the biological knowledge-based signal that is supposed to drive the
learning of the single skills can be identified with the release of phasic dopamine
on the basis of unexpected events (and possibly with the information about asso-
ciative novelty originating in the hippocampus), the identification of the possible
biological implementation of a competence-progress intrinsic motivation signal
is a completely open issue. As the signal should be related to the improvements
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in the acquisition of the agent’s ability to systematically produce some environ-
mental change, then it should originate in parts of the brain that may monitor
the outcomes of the agent’s actions (and, as we are talking about intrinsically
motivated learning, the possible action outcomes should not be innately provided
with value). Finally, since these signals should drive the reinforcement learning
of the high-level selector, it might be related to dopamine, as the lower-level
learning signal.
Interestingly, the pre-limbic cortex, a part of the prefrontal cortex of the
rat, might have the prerequisites to be involved in such a competence-progress
evaluation. First, it is a brain region that is known to be involved in goal-
directed action-outcome learning (Dalley et al., 2004; Heidbreder and Groe-
newegen, 2003). Second, it receives a direct input from the hippocampus, where
signals regarding the novelty of situations are generated. Third, it represents
one of the major excitatory inputs of the ventral tegmental area dopaminergic
neurons (Geisler et al., 2007), and the activation of these connections are known
to produce dopaminergic release (Taber et al., 1995). As we are not aware of
any hypothesis about the functional role of the connections from the prelimbic
cortex to the dopaminergic neurons, it would be interesting to investigate the
possibility that they underlie competence-based intrinsic motivation signals.
8 Summary and open challenges
In this contribution we have discussed the different functions that intrinsic mo-
tivations might play in cumulative learning, and the different mechanisms that
may support these functions in both natural and artificial learning systems. With
respect to the function, we have argued that the ultimate role of intrinsic mo-
tivations is supporting the cumulative acquisition of increasingly complex skills,
and that computational research on this issue would significantly benefit from
making this point more explicit in the proposed models: in our view, models of
intrinsic motivations should aim at letting artificial agent increase their skills,
with the eventual accumulation of knowledge playing only a supporting role.
With respect to the mechanisms, we have argued that both knowledge-based
and competence-based mechanisms might play important roles. The cumulative
acquisition of skills might require some sort of modular and hierarchical archi-
tecture, in which different experts acquire different skills and a selector decides
which expert to use in each situation. In such a hierarchical learning system, in-
trinsic motivations might play two sub-functions: (1) driving the learning of the
experts by setting which are the skills that are to be acquired and (2) driving the
decisions of the selector regarding which expert to train in each context. On the
basis of biological evidence, we have suggested that knowledge-based mechanisms
like the detection of unpredicted events might support the former function, while
we have speculated that competence-based mechanisms measuring the progress
in skill acquisition might support the latter. Several important challenges need to
be tackled in future research, in particular with respect to the goal of modeling
the intrinsically motivated cumulative learning of real organisms.
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A first interesting research direction has to do with knowledge-based intrinsic
motivations. In particular, with the intrinsic reinforcements that are supposed
to support the acquisition of single skills through the discovery of which are the
environmental changes that depend on the behavior of the learning agent and
that thus can become target outcomes for the actions to be learned. As discussed
above, such knowledge-based intrinsic motivations might be represented by un-
expected changes, as seems to be the case for the signals that are triggered by
the superior colliculus, or by the novelty signals that seem to be produced by
the hippocampus. There are a very few models in the literature of these kinds
of mechanisms (e.g. Fiore et al., 2008; Sirois and Mareschal, 2004). In the most
recent of them, we have shown how intrinsic reinforcements due to unexpected
events might be particularly appropriate for driving the accumulation of skills
that can be then deployed for maximizing extrinsic rewards (Mirolli et al., tted;
Santucci et al., 2010). However, reinforcement signals that are so simple can only
represent the very basic ingredients of intrinsically motivated learning. Complex
actions can be acquired only on the basis of more complex learning signals, which
we have argued might be represented by the dopaminergic signals triggered by
the hippocampus on the basis of the perception of novel stimuli or of novel as-
sociations between stimuli. Modeling these more complex forms of intrinsically
motivated learning is a completely open challenge.
A second fundamental issue for future research is checking whether our hy-
pothesis about competence-based intrinsic motivations in real animals can be
supported by animal research, and, in case it is, trying to understand which are
the brain mechanisms that implement competence based motivation signals. In
fact, while the study of competence-based intrinsic motivations is a fundamental
research topic in the psychological literature on motivations in humans (Csik-
szentmihalyi, 1991; De Charms, 1968; Ryan and Deci, 2000), the topic of intrinsic
motivations is now far less hot within the field of animal psychology, and this
literature has been generally focusing more on demonstrating the existence of
knowledge-based intrinsic motivations like novelty, surprise, and curiosity (But-
ler, 1953; Kish, 1955; Reed et al., 1996). Analogously, while we have identified
the putative neural bases of knowledge-based intrinsic motivations (as the activa-
tion of the dopaminergic system by the detection of unexpected changes from the
superior colliculus and, possibly, by the detection of novelty from the hippocam-
pus), the identification of the possible neural mechanisms of competence-based
intrinsic motivation signals (if any) is much harder at the moment, and hence
constitutes a very important challenge for future research.
A further open issue is the identification and development of hierarchi-
cal/modular architectures that can support the kind of intrinsically-motivated
cumulative acquisition of skills that we have discussed so far (Baldassarre and
Mirolli, 2010). Two key requirements for such architectures is that they must
(a) work with continuous state and action spaces, and (b) be capable of learning
autonomously, in particular on the basis of (intrinsic) reinforcement learning sig-
nals. In particular, the capacity of these architectures to learn autonomously and
with continuous state and action spaces would make them relevant both for con-
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trolling robots and for modeling real organisms (in particular if based on neural-
network components). Various hierarchical architectures have been proposed in
the literature but the majority of them is either dependent on abstract/symbolic
representations of space and/or actions (Dayan and Hinton, 1993; Dietterich,
2000; Parr and Russell, 1997; Singh, 1992; Wiering and Schmidhuber, 1997) (see
Barto and Mahadevan, 2003 for a review), or is trained in a supervised fashion
(e.g. Haruno et al., 2001). Although there are exceptions (Caligiore et al., 2010;
Doya et al., 2002; Konidaris and Barto, 2009; Provost et al., 2006; Schembri
et al., 2007c), much more work is needed in this area, given its importance for
implementing intrinsically-motivated cumulative learning.
A last important open issue is related to what we might call goal-driven learn-
ing. With this expression we refer to the possibility that intrinsic motivations
might let a system form goals, and that it is these goals that drive the subsequent
acquisition of skills The computational literature on hierarchical reinforcement
learning has proposed several ways of creating goals, mostly as sub-goals derived
from the final goal related to the task at hand (but see Jonsson and Barto, 2006;
Vigorito and Barto, 2010 for exceptions). Here we refer instead to a situation in
which there is no task to accomplish, but the system is endowed with intrinsic
motivations that allow it to autonomously form goals with respect to which to
acquire a competence, that is the capacity to pursue them in an efficient way.
This capacity might be important for at least two reasons. First, the representa-
tion of the goal could allow the system to generate an intrinsic reward when the
system succeeds in producing the action or the combination of actions that allow
to achieve the goal. This might be crucial for allowing the system to learn the
action or the action combination, i.e. to acquire the competence which reliably
leads to the achievement of the goal itself. Second, it might make the system
activate a number of perceptual and motor processes focused on the acquisition
of a specific competence, while temporarily ignoring other stimuli which might
generate other interfering intrinsic signals. For example, the system might focus
attention on the portion of space and objects relevant for achieving the goal
under focus, or might produce only those actions which are related to achieving
goals similar to the pursued one. Eve this focusing mechanism might be crucial
for learning complex skills. The importance of goals is evident, for example, in
the IMRL systems proposed by Barto Barto et al. (2004), where options are
created for leading the system to salient events (goals), but in that case goals
are decided by the experimented and handcoded. Developing models in which
goals are autonomously formed by the agent on the basis of intrinsic motivations
and drive skill acquisition is another fundamental challenge for future research.
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